[labnetwork] Fire Alarm and HAZMAT panels

Fri Oct 23 11:23:38 EDT 2015

Dear Dr. Michael Khbeis:

Concerning adopted codes –

Given the wealth of knowledge and experience available and gained over the many years of designing stand-alone gas safety systems for both semiconductor fabrication and research facilities… our recommendation is to not limit your gas monitoring – HAZMAT system designs to the local “adopted jurisdictional codes” (minimum code requirements).

For example –

Specific guidance addressing semiconductor facilities can be found in the International Fire Code (IFC) - developed by the International Code Council.  The 2015 edition of the IFC includes a Chapter (27) on “Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities”.

Several other chapters also provide guidance and as a sample include… Emergency Planning and Preparedness, Hazardous Materials, Highly Toxic and Toxic Materials, Flammable Gases and Flammable Cryogenic Fluids, Pyrophoric Materials and several others.

Regarding pyrophorics - the IFC pyrophoric chapter (64) will direct you to comply with ANSI/CGA-G13-2015 for any SiH4 gas or gas mixtures of 1.37% or greater.  This is the CGA standard for “Storage and Handling of Silane and Silane Mixtures”.

The CGA is another great best practice resource for guidance on such things as the classification of toxic gas mixtures (CGA-P20) and a calculation reference for categorizing gas mixtures containing flammable and non-flammable components (CGA-P23).

NFPA now has “NFPA 1 – Fire Code” – along with “NFPA 318: Standard for the Protection of Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities, 2015.”

We also (of course) always reference NFPA 70 (NEC) – along with its “Special Occupancies” sections; addressing the approved “protection techniques” for gas monitoring and equipment located within Hazardous (Classified) locations.  Among several other NFPA codes – NFPA 72 is now the National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code”.

Additional guidance can also be found in the ICC – International Building Code… “use and occupancy classifications, means of egress, etc.

We also find great guidance and subscribe to "SEMI View" and its Guidelines, the ACGIH and SESHA.  FM Global is also a very good resource for specific guidance on safe practices within semiconductor facilities.

Concerning Global Shutdowns –

Depending upon your facility – if equipped with gas detection within contained and ventilated enclosures – we would begin by referencing the IFC “Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities” 2703.13.2.2 Shutoff Gas Supply.

Example – TWL-TLV gas detection within a contained, ventilated and exhausted tool gas box.

This essentially permits you to shut down only the specific upstream gas source detected.  Depending upon gas detection technology – this would include all cross sensitive gases as well.  For example if the gas target is a hydride… and there are other hydrides (AsH3, PH3, B2H6, SiH4, etc.) also feeding the tool gas box – all upstream gas sources (VMB sticks, gas cabinet outlet/s) would also require shutdown – but not necessarily the entire building.  Ambient breathing gas alarms – do more typically involve a global shutdown and evacuation.

Concerning Remote Gas Detection –

As you know – there are many gas detection technologies available – some of which are better suited than others – depending upon your specific gas targets and facility needs.  A supplier assessment is a good first step with the following considerations:

1.       Target gas – and mixtures; TWA-TLV, LEL… alarm level protocol

2.       Gas detection capability:

a.       Lower Detection Limit

b.      Lower Alarm Limit

c.       Cross sensitivities/known interferences

d.      Full measuring range

e.      Drift – zero and span, over sample time periods

f.        Calibration frequency

g.       Sensor response time to T90

3.       Diffusion or Extractive (FEP sample tubing);

a.       If extractive – maximum sample line distance – for each applied  gas family...

b.      If extractive – transport time

4.       Sensor diagnostics

5.       Power requirements

6.       Communication – integrations options - Ethernet/CIP, Analog, other...

7.       Exhaust duct adapter – configuration / size / penetration requirements; for diffusion sensors (LEL, electrochemical) - remote cable assembly lengths, etc.

8.       Cost of Ownership - Periodic sensor replacements – chemcassette tapes / sensor cells

9.       Warranty

Summary –

We typically apply a mix of the best gas detection technology available – that best meets the detection assessment needs for each specific gas target.

In many cases – this is a combination of a “central system” (chemcassette or FTIR) and individual transmitters capable of detecting oxygen depletion, flammable gases (H2, CH4) and other remote locations or with special occupancy needs (Classified areas).

·         For example – the ACGIH – TWA-TLV for AsH3 usually directs us to chemcassette.  If there are several hydride monitoring and AsH3 points needed – this could justify a small central system, ideally, located near the gas targets.

Michael –

We are consulting engineers / system integrators providing TGMS integration with UL listed control platforms – with a dedicated group focused on Toxic Gas Monitoring – Safety Shutdown Systems.

Our systems are configured as “stand-alone” dedicated safety systems. All gas monitoring is interfaced and performed via a dedicated control platform.

This includes both informative local and remote alarm audible/visual notification appliances – along with ThinClient visualization nodes – configured with key detailed alarm information (location, gas type, gas concentration, etc.) – providing emergency response teams with the critical information they need (at safe locations) – to help enable a safe entry and fast recovery.

Our systems are focused on reliability (no covert or fail-danger faults), flexibility and security.

·         In terms of “flexibility” – we recognize change and maintenance is always required. We can disable and isolate only the specific tool points or field devices being revised – without compromise to or disabling of the overall integrity and safety monitoring of the facility or adjoining labs or tools.

We also typically interface with the Fire Alarm System (FAS) and Building Management System (bi-direction signaling) – yet our system logic controllers – are configured similarly to a FAS, with “supervised” wiring, full diagnostics and fail-safe wiring practices – to ensure all gas detection and field safety devices are “available”.

I hope some of this is helpful to you.

Please feel free to contact me directly with any questions or if you would like any additional information.

Thank you,

Jim Blais

Senior Controls Engineer

Hallam-ICS

jblais at hallam-ics.com

South Burlington, VT 05403

Office: 802-658-4891 x1270

Direct: 802-657-4970

Mobile: 802-343-2718

www.Hallam-ICS.com

-----Original Message-----
From: labnetwork-bounces at mtl.mit.edu [mailto:labnetwork-bounces at mtl.mit.edu] On Behalf Of Michael Khbeis
Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2015 7:55 PM
To: labnetwork at mtl.mit.edu
Subject: [labnetwork] Fire Alarm and HAZMAT panels

Dear Colleagues,

We are finalizing designs for our cleanroom renovation and a question regarding how Fire Alarm and HAZMAT panels are integrated came up.  Currently our HAZMAT panel with toxic gas monitors, gas cabinets, and burn-box monitor also has yellow pull stations and HAZMAT alarms on it. HAZMAT alarms trigger a relocation alarm but not a fire alarm for the whole building. High level gas leak will trigger the fire alarm panel and dump the building. We have several issues with this architecture - for example currently it is all or nothing so if one of the gas cabinets has a problem they all get tripped. Also, if we are working on a system the pull stations and strobes have to be bypassed.  Clearly less than ideal. Another issue is the fire code isn’t really geared toward semiconductor fab facilities, so our code description is lacking.

For those of you with experience or relatively new facilities, can you please share a little about your system architecture and HAZMAT/TGM systems?  Also, we are planning on migrating from our Zellweger/MDA System 16 to remote gas monitoring.  Can I please have some feedback on experience with remote monitors and replacement/maintenance vs the central systems?

Gratefully,

Dr. Michael Khbeis

Associate Director, Washington Nanofabrication Facility (WNF) National Nanotechnology Infrastructure Network (NNIN) University of Washington Fluke Hall, Box 352143

(O) 206.543.5101

(F) 206.221.1681

(C) 443.254.5192

khbeis at uw.edu<mailto:khbeis at uw.edu>

www.wnf.washington.edu/<http://www.wnf.washington.edu/>

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